Kritična analiza programa OECD Tax and Development Days 2026

 

Avtor: mag. Franc Derganc, SLOVENIA – koordinator AI ANALITIKA JAVNE OBLASTI, ki deluje v okvirih KODE in BAZE ZNANJA avtorja mag. Franc Derganc

Datum: 1.6.2026

Veza:

1. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/events/2026/06/oecd-tax-and-development-days-2026/oecd-tax-and-development-days-2026-sessions.pdf
2. https://www.oecd.org/en/events/2026/06/oecd-tax-and-development-days-2026.html?adestraproject=OECD%20Tax%20News&utm_campaign=tax-news-28-may-2026-oecd-tax-and-dev-days-2026&utm_content=oecd-tax-and-dev-days-2026-event-webpage&utm_term=ctp&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Adestra

 

1. Osnovni problem: program govori jezik “razvoja”, v resnici pa varuje arhitekturo globalne davčne neenakosti

Program OECD Tax and Development Days 2026 je na prvi pogled zasnovan pozitivno: govori o davčni kapaciteti, boljših davčnih politikah, skladnosti, zaupanju, transparentnosti, podatkih in razvojnem učinku. Osrednja tema je From Rules to Results: Turning Tax Policy into Development Impact.

Toda že naslov razkriva bistveno težavo: OECD problem predstavi kot vprašanje izvedbe pravil, ne pa kot vprašanje poštenosti pravil. Program predpostavlja, da so obstoječa mednarodna davčna pravila v osnovi legitimna, težava naj bi bila le v tem, da jih države v razvoju, davčne uprave in zavezanci premalo učinkovito izvajajo.

To je ideološko izhodišče, ne nevtralna strokovna ugotovitev.

 

2. OECD kot “tehnični upravljavec” sistema, ki koristi največjim

Največja vsebinska težava programa je, da OECD nastopa kot nevtralni strokovni koordinator, čeprav je v zadnjih desetletjih prav OECD eden ključnih arhitektov sistema, ki je omogočil:

• globalno davčno konkurenco,
• kompleksna pravila transfernih cen,
• davčno načrtovanje multinacionalk,
• prenos dobičkov v ugodnejše jurisdikcije,
• privilegiran položaj velikih družb z močnimi pravnimi in davčnimi oddelki,
• nesorazmerno breme skladnosti za mikro, mala in srednja podjetja.

Program zato ne odpira ključnega vprašanja: ali je mednarodni davčni sistem sploh še pošten za običajne davčne zavezance, delavce in MMSP?

Namesto tega ponuja boljšo administracijo, več podatkov, več izmenjave informacij, več digitalizacije in več “capacity buildinga”. To pomeni: sistem ostane enak, države in manjši zavezanci pa naj se mu bolje prilagodijo.

 

3. Transferne cene: legalizirana kompleksnost za velike, kaznovalni aparat za manjše

Ena izmed prvih sej je posvečena transfernim cenam: Transfer Pricing: Pathways to Enhanced Certainty in a Changing Global Landscape. Program navaja, da so transferne cene “centralne” za mobilizacijo domačih prihodkov v državah v razvoju, nato pa ponuja ukrepe za večjo davčno gotovost, med drugim Amount B kot poenostavljen pristop za določene distribucijske dejavnosti.

Tu je temeljni problem.

Transferne cene so eno najbolj očitnih področij, kjer se ustvarja razredna davčna neenakost med velikimi in malimi:

Velike multinacionalke imajo svetovalce, dokumentacijo, primerjalne analize, APA postopke, MAP postopke, pravne memorandume in možnost večletnega davčnega spora.

Mikro in mala podjetja pa pogosto nimajo niti kadrov niti sredstev, da bi razumela vsa pravila, kaj šele da bi vodila večjurisdikcijske postopke.

OECD v programu ne problematizira, da je transfer pricing postal industrija sama zase. Namesto vprašanja “ali je ta sistem sploh še primeren” se sprašuje, kako ga narediti bolj predvidljivega za “business”.

To je bistveno: gotovost za velike ni nujno pravičnost za družbo.

 

4. MAP in davčna gotovost: zaščita kapitala pred državami, ne zaščita ljudi pred sistemom

Druga pomembna seja je Making Dispute Resolution Work: Strengthening the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP). Program poudarja, da učinkovit, pravočasen MAP ustvarja predvidljivo davčno okolje za vlade in podjetja.

Vendar je MAP tipičen instrument, ki je v praksi dostopen predvsem velikim čezmejnim subjektom. Navadni podjetnik, obrtnik, samozaposleni, lokalni d.o.o. ali družinsko podjetje v takem sistemu praviloma nima realnega dostopa do primerljive ravni zaščite.

Zato nastane dvojni standard:

Veliki kapital dobi meddržavni postopek, diplomatsko-davčno komunikacijo in možnost odprave dvojne obdavčitve.

Mali zavezanec dobi nacionalni davčni nadzor, roke, globe, zamudne obresti in pogosto stroškovno nedosegljivo sodno varstvo.

Program govori o “tax certainty”, vendar ne pove: za koga?

 

5. Globalni minimalni davek: veliko ime, majhen realni učinek

Seja Global Minimum Tax: Stability, Simplification and Competitiveness naj bi obravnavala stabilnost, poenostavitev in konkurenčnost pri globalnem minimalnem davku.

Kritična poanta je, da se globalni minimalni davek pogosto predstavlja kot zgodovinska reforma, v resnici pa je kompromis, ki še vedno ohranja logiko globalne davčne konkurence. Namesto jasnega pravila, da mora dobiček biti obdavčen tam, kjer nastaja realna ekonomska vrednost, se ohranja zapleten sistem pragov, izjem, izračunov, kvalificiranih pravil in administrativnih varovalk.

To je sistem, ki ga lahko uporabljajo največji. Manjši ga ne uporabljajo — ga pa posredno plačujejo, ker države zaradi poddavčitve kapitala breme pogosto prenašajo na:

• delo,
• potrošnjo,
• prispevke,
• DDV,
• male podjetnike,
• lokalne zavezance.

Zato je treba program brati tudi kot dokument, ki govori o “razvoju”, hkrati pa ne postavi osrednjega vprašanja: zakaj mora delo plačati skoraj vse, kapital pa se pogaja?

 

6. DDV v digitalni dobi: več nadzora nad malimi, premalo pravičnosti pri velikih platformah

Program vključuje sejo VAT in the Digital Age: Enhancing Compliance and Administration, kjer se poudarja uporaba transakcijskih podatkov in plačilnih informacij za krepitev skladnosti in DDV administracije.

To je lahko koristno, vendar tudi nevarno.

Digitalizacija DDV pomeni, da bodo države vse bolj nadzorovale vsako transakcijo. Teoretično to velja za vse. V praksi pa se pogosto zgodi, da so najbolj nadzorovani ravno manjši zavezanci: lokalni gostinci, obrtniki, trgovci, mikro podjetniki, samozaposleni.

Velike platforme, digitalni posredniki in tehnološki konglomerati pa imajo kompleksne strukture, pravne ekipe, algoritme, podatkovno moč in globalne davčne modele.

Tako nastane nova davčna realnost:
mali zavezanec je transparenten do zadnjega računa, veliki digitalni kapital pa ostaja strukturno nepregleden.

To je bistvo tehnofevdalne davčne arhitekture: podatki malih so predmet nadzora, podatki velikih pa so poslovna skrivnost, intelektualna lastnina ali arhitekturno razpršeni med jurisdikcijami.

 

7. “Tax morale”: moraliziranje plačnikov davkov brez resnega vprašanja pravičnosti

Seja Understanding and Strengthening Tax Morale poudarja, da je visoka davčna morala ključna za učinkovite in vzdržne davčne sisteme.

To je pravilno, vendar nezadostno.

Davčna morala ni psihološka lastnost državljanov. Davčna morala je posledica zaznane pravičnosti sistema. Če ljudje vidijo, da:

delavec plačuje visoke prispevke in dohodnino,

mali podjetnik nosi breme pravil,

država strogo nadzira lokalne zavezance,

multinacionalke pa optimizirajo dobičke prek pravil, ki jih same razumejo bolje kot države,

potem davčna morala ne pade zaradi “pomanjkanja ozaveščenosti”, ampak zaradi izgube legitimnosti sistema.

OECD bi moral zato najprej vprašati:
Ali sistem, ki ga soustvarjamo, sploh zasluži davčno moralo?

 

8. Davčne spodbude: problem ni samo pomanjkanje podatkov, ampak politična ugrabitev davčne politike

Seja Tax Incentives: Better Evidence to Drive Reform govori o tem, da so investicijske davčne spodbude razširjene, težko primerljive in težko ocenljive. Predvidena je predstavitev OECD baze davčnih spodbud za več kot 70 držav v razvoju.

To je pomembno, vendar program znova ostane na tehnični ravni.

Davčne spodbude niso samo metodološki problem. So problem politične ekonomije. Pogosto pomenijo, da država zniža davčno breme velikim investitorjem v imenu razvoja, manko prihodkov pa nadomesti pri domačih davčnih zavezancih.

MMSP praviloma ne dobijo individualnih davčnih dogovorov, posebnih režimov, ciljnih spodbud ali strateških obravnav. Dobijo splošna pravila in nadzor.

Tako nastane sistem, kjer država velikim reče:
“Kaj potrebujete, da ostanete?”

Malim pa reče:
“Izpolnite obrazec, plačajte prispevke in pazite na rok.”

 

9. Varstvo podatkov davčnih zavezancev: pomembno, vendar selektivno

Seja Protecting Taxpayer Data to Safeguard Trust poudarja zaupnost, informacijsko varnost in varovanje podatkov zavezancev.

To je pomembna tema. Toda v širšem kontekstu digitalne davčne države se odpira dodatno vprašanje: kdo ima dejansko podatkovno moč?

Davčne uprave pridobivajo vedno več podatkov o zavezancih. Tehnološki ponudniki, platforme in veliki zasebni sistemi pa pridobivajo vedno več podatkov o ekonomskem vedenju ljudi in podjetij. OECD program te asimetrije ne problematizira dovolj.

V tehnofevdalnem sistemu niso ključni samo davki. Ključni so:

• podatki,
• platforme,
• infrastruktura,
• standardi,
• dostop do pravil,
• sposobnost vplivanja na pravila.

Tisti, ki nadzira infrastrukturo, ne potrebuje nujno najvišje nominalne davčne stopnje. Ima že moč določati pogoje sodelovanja.

 

10. Največja odsotnost programa: mikro, mala in srednja podjetja

Najbolj zgovorno je, česa v programu skoraj ni.

Program govori o državah v razvoju, davčnih upravah, mednarodnih organizacijah, podjetjih, civilni družbi, podatkih, davčni gotovosti, transfernih cenah, MAP, globalnem minimalnem davku in digitalizaciji. Toda mikro, mala in srednja podjetja niso postavljena v središče kot posebna ranljiva skupina davčnega sistema.

To je temeljna pomanjkljivost.

MMSP so v realnem gospodarstvu pogosto tisti, ki:

• zaposlujejo lokalno,
• plačujejo davke tam, kjer delujejo,
• nimajo davčnih oaz,
• nimajo struktur za agresivno davčno načrtovanje,
• nimajo kapacitet za kompleksne postopke,
• nosijo nesorazmerno administrativno breme.

In prav zato bi moral biti program zasnovan drugače: ne kot program “kako države naučiti izvajati globalna pravila”, ampak kot program kako globalna pravila prilagoditi poštenosti, sposobnosti plačila in realni zmogljivosti zavezancev.

 

11. Kje so etični in strokovni pomočniki v javno-dajatvenih zadevah?

Največja slepa pega programa OECD ni samo v tem, da skoraj ne govori o mikro, malih in srednjih podjetjih. Še bolj problematično je, da program skoraj v celoti spregleda vprašanje pravice davčnega zavezanca do točne, pravočasne, celovite in razumljive davčne informacije.

Program sicer govori o “trust”, “transparency”, “tax morale”, “better tax administration”, “data” in “capacity building”, vendar se vprašanje zaupanja obravnava predvsem z vidika države: kako izboljšati pobiranje davkov, kako povečati skladnost, kako izmenjevati informacije, kako preprečevati utaje, kako uporabiti podatke.

Manjka pa bistveno vprašanje:

Kdo v sistemu zavezancu pomaga, da pravilno izpolni svojo davčno obveznost, še preden pride do napake, nadzora, globe ali spora?

To je temelj poštenega davčnega sistema.

Davčna država ne sme biti zgrajena samo kot aparat nadzora. Če država od človeka, podjetnika ali družbe zahteva pravilno izpolnitev kompleksnih javno-dajatvenih obveznosti, mora zagotoviti tudi realno možnost, da zavezanec razume:

kaj mora storiti, do kdaj mora storiti, na kateri pravni podlagi, s kakšnimi posledicami in s kakšnim varstvom, če informacija ni pravilna.

Zato je v javno-dajatvenih zadevah nujen nov institut: etični in strokovni pomočnik zavezanca.

Ta pomočnik ne bi smel biti lobist, prodajalec davčnih shem ali podaljšana roka države. Njegova naloga bi morala biti bistveno bolj ustavna in javnopravna: pomagati, da se davčna obveznost izpolni pravilno, pravočasno in v skladu z načelom zakonitosti, sorazmernosti, pravne varnosti in zaupanja v pravo.

V poštenem davčnem sistemu bi morali biti taki pomočniki priznani kot del infrastrukture pravne države. Sem spadajo davčni svetovalci, računovodje, pravni svetovalci, informacijski sistemi, javni pojasnjevalni mehanizmi in tudi odgovorno uporabljeni AI pomočniki — vendar le pod pogojem, da delujejo pod jasnimi etičnimi, strokovnimi in odgovornostnimi pravili.

Problem OECD programa je, da takšnega vprašanja ne postavi v središče. Govori o krepitvi davčnih uprav, podatkih, digitalizaciji in izmenjavi informacij, ne govori pa dovolj o tem, da mora imeti zavezanec pravico do kakovostne davčne pomoči.

Brez tega je “tax morale” prazna beseda.

Davčna morala ne nastane tako, da država ljudi uči, naj bolj zaupajo sistemu. Nastane tako, da sistem ljudem vsak dan dokazuje, da je vreden zaupanja. To pomeni, da mora zavezanec prejeti informacijo, ki je:

točna, ker napačna informacija povzroči napačno izpolnitev obveznosti;
pravočasna, ker prepozna informacija ne prepreči škode;
celovita, ker polovična informacija pogosto zavaja;
razumljiva, ker pravica, ki je zavezanec ne razume, v praksi ne obstaja;
sledljiva, ker mora biti jasno, kdo je informacijo dal, kdaj, na kateri pravni podlagi in s kakšnim učinkom.

Če tega ni, potem davčni sistem ni pošten, ampak kaznovalen. Zavezanec je najprej prepuščen kompleksnosti pravil, nato pa se ga kaznuje, ker jih ni pravilno razumel.

Prav zato bi moral OECD, če bi res govoril o pravičnem razvojnem davčnem sistemu, posebno poglavje nameniti vprašanju:

Kako zagotoviti zavezancu pravico do strokovne, etične in odgovorne pomoči v javno-dajatvenih zadevah?

Brez tega bo digitalizacija davčne uprave pomenila predvsem hitrejši nadzor. Brez tega bo izmenjava informacij pomenila predvsem večjo moč države. Brez tega bo umetna inteligenca pomenila predvsem avtomatizirano neenakost. Brez tega bo “poenostavitev” pomenila zgolj poenostavitev za administracijo, ne pa za človeka.

Sklepno:

Pošten davčni sistem se ne začne pri globi, nadzoru ali izmenjavi podatkov. Začne se pri pravici zavezanca, da pravočasno dobi točno, celovito in razumljivo davčno informacijo.

In še ostreje:

Če država zahteva popolno davčno skladnost, mora najprej zagotoviti popolno informacijsko poštenost.

 

Sklepna ocena

Program OECD Tax and Development Days 2026 je predstavljen kot razvojni, strokovni in vključujoč dogodek, ki naj bi pomagal državam krepiti davčne sisteme, mobilizirati javne prihodke in povečati zaupanje v davčno upravo. Toda kritična analiza pokaže, da program ostaja znotraj istega miselnega okvira, ki je pomembno prispeval k današnji globalni davčni neenakosti: pravila ostanejo skoraj nedotaknjena, države in zavezanci pa naj se jim zgolj učinkoviteje prilagodijo.

Ključna pomanjkljivost programa je, da govori o rezultatih, ne da bi dovolj pošteno odprl vprašanje pravičnosti pravil. Govori o davčni gotovosti, vendar predvsem za velike čezmejne gospodarske subjekte. Govori o poenostavitvi, vendar v sistemu, ki ostaja strukturno zapleten. Govori o davčni morali, vendar ne začne pri temeljni predpostavki: davčna morala lahko obstaja samo tam, kjer zavezanci verjamejo, da sistem enako in pošteno obravnava delo, kapital, mala podjetja in multinacionalke.

Največja nevarnost tega programa je, da pod jezikom razvoja, transparentnosti, podatkov in digitalizacije utrjuje davčni model, v katerem imajo veliki dostop do pravil, dogovorov, svetovalcev, mednarodnih postopkov in davčne gotovosti, mali pa dobijo obveznosti, roke, obrazce, nadzor in globe. To ni pošten davčni sistem. To je sistem asimetrije moči.

Zato program ni mogoče brati samo kot tehnični dogodek OECD. Brati ga je treba kot dokument politične ekonomije. Razkriva, kdo ima sedež za mizo, kdo piše pravila in kdo jih mora izvajati. V tem smislu OECD ne nastopa zgolj kot nevtralni strokovni posrednik, ampak kot eden izmed upravljavcev globalne davčne arhitekture, ki velikim zagotavlja predvidljivost, malim pa nalaga skladnost.

Posebej problematično je, da program skoraj ne postavi v središče mikro, malih in srednjih podjetij, čeprav so prav ta podjetja hrbtenica lokalnih gospodarstev, zaposlovanja in dejanskega plačevanja davkov tam, kjer vrednost nastaja. MMSP nimajo davčnih oaz, nimajo mednarodnih struktur, nimajo oddelkov za transferne cene in nimajo možnosti večletnih meddržavnih postopkov. Imajo pa vsakodnevno breme kompleksnih pravil, stroškov skladnosti in pravne negotovosti.

Še večja slepa pega programa je odsotnost vprašanja, kdo zavezancu zagotavlja točno, pravočasno, celovito in razumljivo davčno informacijo. Brez tega ni poštenega davčnega sistema. Če država zahteva pravilno izpolnitev javno-dajatvenih obveznosti, mora najprej zagotoviti realne pogoje, da zavezanec sploh lahko ve, kaj je njegova obveznost. Davčna skladnost brez informacijske poštenosti ni pravna država, ampak kaznovalni aparat.

Zato bi moral biti temelj vsake resne davčne reforme drugačen: ne več vprašanje, kako še učinkoviteje nadzirati zavezance, ampak kako vzpostaviti sistem, v katerem so pravila razumljiva, informacije zanesljive, pomoč dostopna, davčna bremena sorazmerna, postopki pošteni, odgovornost države pa dejanska.

Končna ocena je zato ostra:

Program OECD Tax and Development Days 2026 ne ruši globalnega davčnega fevdalizma. Nasprotno — pomaga ga strokovno urejati, digitalizirati, legitimirati in administrativno optimizirati.

Ali še krajše:

Za velike se ustvarja davčna gotovost. Za male se ustvarja davčna disciplina.

In prav tu je temeljni problem sodobne davčne države:

dokler bodo veliki sodelovali pri oblikovanju pravil, mali pa jih bodo le izpolnjevali, davčni sistem ne bo pošten, ampak zgolj učinkoviteje upravljana neenakost.

 

12. Transparentnost metode: analiza kot rezultat profila »AI Analitik javne oblasti«

Zaradi poštenosti do bralca je treba jasno povedati, da zgornja kritična analiza programa OECD Tax and Development Days 2026 ni nastala kot nevtralni povzetek programa OECD, temveč kot vrednotna, pravna in javno-upravna presoja, izvedena skozi profil AI Analitika javne oblasti.

Gre za analitični agentni profil, ki deluje na podlagi vnaprej določenega konceptualnega okvira, kode, pravil sklepanja in baze znanja, katere avtor je mag. Franc Derganc. Analiza zato ni zgolj opis programa, ampak presoja programa z vidika poštenega davčnega sistema, človekovih pravic, dobre uprave, javno-dajatvene pravičnosti in dejanskega položaja mikro, malih in srednjih podjetij.

Ključni element tega profila je izhodišče, da človekove pravice ne obstajajo samo kot formalna besedila, temveč kot dejanski pogoji življenja. Temeljno načelo, vgrajeno v profil AI Analitika javne oblasti, je zato preprosto: brez pogojev ni človekovih pravic. Če človek, podjetnik ali družba nima dostopa do razumljivih pravil, pravočasnih informacij, poštenega postopka, učinkovitega pravnega sredstva in stvarnih možnosti za izpolnitev obveznosti, potem pravice obstajajo le na papirju.

To načelo je posebej pomembno v javno-dajatvenih zadevah. Davki, prispevki, dajatve, globe, obresti in administrativne obveznosti niso tehnične podrobnosti. So neposreden poseg v premoženje, delo, podjetniško svobodo, socialno varnost in dostojanstvo posameznika. Zato mora biti vsaka davčna politika presojana tudi skozi prizmo ekonomskih človekovih pravic: ali sistem ljudem omogoča dostojno življenje, pošteno podjetništvo, predvidljivost, pravno varnost in realno možnost sodelovanja v skupnosti.

Drugi temeljni element profila je razumevanje jezika kot nosilca pravne države in skupnosti. Jezik ni zgolj komunikacijsko sredstvo. Je temelj kulture, naroda, pravne razumljivosti in demokratične udeležbe. Če so pravila zapisana v jeziku, ki ga zavezanci ne razumejo, ali če se javna oblast sklicuje na strokovni žargon, ki je razumljiv samo velikim svetovalnim sistemom, potem formalna enakost pred zakonom ne pomeni dejanske enakosti. V davčnem sistemu je zato razumljiv jezik pogoj za pravičnost.

Tretji element profila je načelo, da brez uspešnosti oblasti ni dobrega upravljanja. Dobra uprava ni samo zakonita uprava. Dobra uprava mora biti tudi učinkovita, merljiva, odgovorna, predvidljiva in usmerjena v človeka. Če javna oblast sprejema programe, strategije in reforme, ne da bi jasno pokazala učinke za ljudi, za MMSP, za javne finance, za pravno varnost in za zaupanje v sistem, potem ne gre za dobro upravljanje, ampak za administrativno reprodukcijo obstoječega stanja.

Četrti element profila je vgrajena sodna praksa in pravni standardi prava EU, Sodišča EU, Evropskega sodišča za človekove pravice in ustavnopravnih standardov pravne države. To pomeni, da se javno-dajatveni sistem ne presoja samo po tem, ali je formalno sprejet, ampak tudi po tem, ali spoštuje načela zakonitosti, sorazmernosti, pravne varnosti, varstva legitimnih pričakovanj, enake obravnave, učinkovitega pravnega sredstva, varstva premoženja in poštenega postopka.

Zato AI Analitik javne oblasti pri presoji programa OECD ne sprašuje zgolj:
Kaj program obljublja?

Vprašanje je bistveno strožje:
Komu program dejansko koristi, kdo nosi breme, kdo ima dostop do pravil, kdo ima dostop do pomoči in kdo ima realno možnost varstva svojih pravic?

Prav zaradi takšnega profila analiza ne sprejme samoumevne predpostavke, da so izrazi, kot so »tax certainty«, »simplification«, »capacity building«, »tax morale«, »data« in »development impact«, sami po sebi pozitivni. Ti izrazi so lahko koristni, lahko pa so tudi jezik legitimacije sistema, v katerem se moč velikih gospodarskih subjektov dodatno utrjuje, medtem ko se malim zavezancem nalaga vedno večja skladnost.

Metodološko je zato analiza zasnovana kot kritična presoja javne oblasti in mednarodnih davčnih institucij, ne kot promocijski povzetek OECD programa. Njena naloga ni, da ponovi uradni jezik programa, ampak da razkrije, kaj ta jezik prikrije: asimetrijo moči, neenako dostopnost postopkov, nesorazmerno breme malih zavezancev in odsotnost pravice do točne, pravočasne, celovite in razumljive davčne informacije.

Pomembno je tudi poudariti, da AI Analitik javne oblasti ni zamišljen kot nadomestek človekove presoje. Je analitično orodje, ki pomaga sistematično preverjati javne politike skozi vnaprej določena merila: človekove pravice, učinkovitost oblasti, jezikovno razumljivost, poštenost javnih dajatev, varstvo šibkejših zavezancev, transparentnost pravil in odgovornost institucij. Končno vrednotenje pa ostaja stvar človeka, stroke in demokratične razprave.

Zato je tudi ta analiza sama sebi postavila standard transparentnosti. Bralcu jasno pove, iz katerega vrednotnega in metodološkega okvira izhaja. Ne pretvarja se, da je brez stališča. Nasprotno: njeno stališče je izrecno navedeno. Davčni sistem je treba presojati po tem, ali služi človeku, skupnosti, pravni državi in pošteni porazdelitvi javnih bremen — ne po tem, ali je administrativno primeren za velike igralce globalnega kapitala.

Sklepno:

AI Analitik javne oblasti izhaja iz predpostavke, da javna oblast ni uspešna takrat, ko zna pobrati več podatkov, izvesti več nadzora ali ustvariti več pravil. Uspešna je takrat, ko človeku in malemu zavezancu zagotovi realne pogoje za razumevanje, izpolnitev in varstvo njegovih pravic.

Ali še krajše:

Brez pogojev ni človekovih pravic. Brez razumljivega jezika ni pravne države. Brez uspešne oblasti ni dobre uprave. Brez poštenih informacij ni poštenega davčnega sistema.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ENGLISH:

 

 

Critical Analysis of the OECD Tax and Development Days 2026 Programme

Tax justice for developing countries? No — a global tax architecture for those who know how not to pay.

Author: mag. Franc Derganc, Slovenia – Coordinator of the AI PUBLIC AUTHORITY ANALYST, operating within the framework of the CODE and KNOWLEDGE BASE authored by mag. Franc Derganc
Date: 1 June 2026
References:

1. OECD Tax and Development Days 2026 – sessions programme
2. OECD Tax and Development Days 2026 – event webpage

 

1. The Fundamental Problem: The Programme Speaks the Language of “Development”, but in Reality Protects the Architecture of Global Tax Inequality

At first glance, the OECD Tax and Development Days 2026 programme appears to be designed in a positive manner: it speaks of tax capacity, better tax policies, compliance, trust, transparency, data and development impact. Its central theme is From Rules to Results: Turning Tax Policy into Development Impact.

However, the very title already reveals the essential problem: the OECD presents the issue as one of implementing rules, rather than as one of the fairness of the rules themselves. The programme assumes that existing international tax rules are, in principle, legitimate, and that the problem merely lies in the fact that developing countries, tax administrations and taxpayers do not implement them effectively enough.

This is an ideological starting point, not a neutral expert finding.

 

2. The OECD as the “Technical Manager” of a System that Benefits the Largest Players

The most significant substantive problem of the programme is that the OECD presents itself as a neutral expert coordinator, although over recent decades it has been one of the key architects of a system that has enabled:

• global tax competition,
• complex transfer pricing rules,
• tax planning by multinational enterprises,
• the shifting of profits to more favourable jurisdictions,
• a privileged position for large corporations with powerful legal and tax departments,
• a disproportionate compliance burden for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises.

The programme therefore fails to address the key question: is the international tax system still fair at all for ordinary taxpayers, workers and MSMEs?

Instead, it offers better administration, more data, more exchange of information, more digitalisation and more “capacity building”. This means that the system remains the same, while states and smaller taxpayers are expected to adapt to it more effectively.

 

3. Transfer Pricing: Legalised Complexity for the Large, a Punitive Apparatus for the Small

One of the first sessions is devoted to transfer pricing: Transfer Pricing: Pathways to Enhanced Certainty in a Changing Global Landscape. The programme states that transfer pricing is “central” to domestic revenue mobilisation in developing countries and then offers measures to enhance tax certainty, including Amount B as a simplified approach for certain distribution activities.

This is where the fundamental problem lies.

Transfer pricing is one of the most obvious areas in which class-based tax inequality between large and small taxpayers is created.

Large multinational enterprises have advisers, documentation, benchmarking analyses, APA procedures, MAP procedures, legal memoranda and the possibility of conducting multi-year tax disputes.

Micro and small enterprises, on the other hand, often have neither the staff nor the resources to understand all the rules, let alone to conduct multi-jurisdictional procedures.

The OECD programme does not problematise the fact that transfer pricing has become an industry in itself. Instead of asking whether this system is still appropriate at all, it asks how to make it more predictable for “business”.

This is essential: certainty for the large is not necessarily fairness for society.

 

4. MAP and Tax Certainty: Protection of Capital Against States, Not Protection of People Against the System

Another important session is Making Dispute Resolution Work: Strengthening the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP). The programme emphasises that an efficient, effective and timely MAP creates a predictable tax environment for governments and businesses.

However, MAP is a typical instrument that, in practice, is accessible primarily to large cross-border entities. An ordinary entrepreneur, craftsman, self-employed person, local limited liability company or family business generally has no real access to a comparable level of protection within such a system.

This creates a double standard.

Large capital receives an intergovernmental procedure, diplomatic-tax communication and the possibility of eliminating double taxation.

The small taxpayer receives national tax audits, deadlines, penalties, default interest and often judicial protection that is financially out of reach.

The programme speaks of “tax certainty”, but does not say: for whom?

 

5. The Global Minimum Tax: A Big Name, a Limited Real Effect

The session Global Minimum Tax: Stability, Simplification and Competitiveness is intended to address stability, simplification and competitiveness in the context of the global minimum tax.

The critical point is that the global minimum tax is often presented as a historic reform, whereas in reality it is a compromise that continues to preserve the logic of global tax competition. Instead of a clear rule that profit must be taxed where real economic value is created, a complex system of thresholds, exceptions, calculations, qualified rules and administrative safeguards is maintained.

This is a system that can be used by the largest players. Smaller taxpayers do not use it — but they indirectly pay for it, because, due to the undertaxation of capital, states often shift the burden onto:

• labour,
• consumption,
• social security contributions,
  VAT,
• small entrepreneurs,
• local taxpayers.

The programme must therefore also be read as a document which speaks of “development”, while at the same time failing to ask the central question: why must labour pay almost everything, while capital negotiates?

 

6. VAT in the Digital Age: More Supervision of the Small, Too Little Fairness Regarding Large Platforms

The programme includes the session VAT in the Digital Age: Enhancing Compliance and Administration, which emphasises the use of transactional data and payment information to strengthen compliance and VAT administration.

This may be useful, but it is also dangerous.

The digitalisation of VAT means that states will increasingly supervise every transaction. In theory, this applies to everyone. In practice, however, it often happens that the most heavily supervised are precisely smaller taxpayers: local hospitality providers, craftsmen, traders, micro-entrepreneurs and self-employed persons.

Large platforms, digital intermediaries and technology conglomerates, by contrast, have complex structures, legal teams, algorithms, data power and global tax models.

This creates a new tax reality:

the small taxpayer is transparent down to the last invoice, while large digital capital remains structurally opaque.

This is the essence of the techno-feudal tax architecture: the data of the small are the object of supervision, while the data of the large are treated as a trade secret, intellectual property or are architecturally dispersed across jurisdictions.

 

7. “Tax Morale”: Moralising Taxpayers Without Seriously Addressing Fairness

The session Understanding and Strengthening Tax Morale emphasises that high tax morale is essential for effective and sustainable tax systems.

This is correct, but insufficient.

Tax morale is not a psychological trait of citizens. Tax morale is the result of the perceived fairness of the system. If people see that:

• a worker pays high social security contributions and personal income tax,
• a small entrepreneur bears the burden of the rules,
• the state strictly supervises local taxpayers,
• while multinational enterprises optimise profits through rules that they understand better than states themselves,
• then tax morale does not decline because of a “lack of awareness”, but because of the loss of legitimacy of the system.

The OECD should therefore first ask:

Does the system we are co-creating even deserve tax morale?

 

8. Tax Incentives: The Problem Is Not Merely a Lack of Data, but the Political Capture of Tax Policy

The session Tax Incentives: Better Evidence to Drive Reform states that investment tax incentives are widely used, difficult to compare and difficult to evaluate. The launch of the OECD Investment Tax Incentives Database covering more than 70 developing economies is envisaged.

This is important, but the programme again remains at a technical level.

Tax incentives are not merely a methodological problem. They are a problem of political economy. They often mean that the state reduces the tax burden of large investors in the name of development, while the shortfall in revenue is offset by domestic taxpayers.

MSMEs generally do not receive individual tax agreements, special regimes, targeted incentives or strategic treatment. They receive general rules and supervision.

This creates a system in which the state says to the large:

“What do you need in order to stay?”

And to the small:

“Complete the form, pay the contributions and mind the deadline.”

 

9. Protection of Taxpayer Data: Important, but Selective

The session Protecting Taxpayer Data to Safeguard Trust emphasises confidentiality, information security and the protection of taxpayer data.

This is an important topic. However, in the broader context of the digital tax state, an additional question arises: who actually has data power?

Tax administrations are acquiring ever more data on taxpayers. Technology providers, platforms and large private systems are acquiring ever more data on the economic behaviour of individuals and businesses. The OECD programme does not sufficiently problematise this asymmetry.

In a techno-feudal system, the key elements are not only taxes. The key elements are:

• data,
• platforms,
• infrastructure,
• standards,
• access to rules,
• the ability to influence rules.

Whoever controls the infrastructure does not necessarily need the highest nominal tax rate. They already have the power to determine the conditions of participation.

 

10. The Programme’s Most Significant Absence: Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises

The most telling point is what is almost absent from the programme.

The programme speaks of developing countries, tax administrations, international organisations, businesses, civil society, data, tax certainty, transfer pricing, MAP, the global minimum tax and digitalisation. Yet micro, small and medium-sized enterprises are not placed at the centre as a specific vulnerable group within the tax system.

This is a fundamental deficiency.

In the real economy, MSMEs are often those that:

• employ locally,
• pay taxes where they operate,
• have no tax havens,
• have no structures for aggressive tax planning,
• lack the capacity for complex procedures,
• bear a disproportionate administrative burden.

For precisely this reason, the programme should have been designed differently: not as a programme on “how to teach states to implement global rules”, but as a programme on how to adapt global rules to fairness, ability to pay and the real capacities of taxpayers.

 

11. Where Are the Ethical and Professional Assistants in Public-Charge Matters?

The greatest blind spot of the OECD programme is not only that it says almost nothing about micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. Even more problematic is that the programme almost entirely overlooks the issue of the taxpayer’s right to accurate, timely, comprehensive and understandable tax information.

The programme does speak of “trust”, “transparency”, “tax morale”, “better tax administration”, “data” and “capacity building”, but the issue of trust is addressed primarily from the perspective of the state: how to improve tax collection, how to increase compliance, how to exchange information, how to prevent evasion, how to use data.

What is missing is the essential question:

Who in the system assists the taxpayer in correctly fulfilling their tax obligation before an error, audit, penalty or dispute arises?

This is the foundation of a fair tax system.

The tax state must not be constructed merely as an apparatus of supervision. If the state requires an individual, entrepreneur or company to correctly fulfil complex public-charge obligations, it must also ensure a real possibility for the taxpayer to understand:

what must be done, by when it must be done, on which legal basis, with what consequences and with what protection if the information is incorrect.

For this reason, a new institution is necessary in public-charge matters: the ethical and professional assistant to the taxpayer.

Such an assistant should not be a lobbyist, a seller of tax schemes or an extended arm of the state. Their task should be much more constitutional and public-law oriented: to help ensure that the tax obligation is fulfilled correctly, on time and in accordance with the principles of legality, proportionality, legal certainty and legitimate trust in the law.

In a fair tax system, such assistants should be recognised as part of the infrastructure of the rule of law. This includes tax advisers, accountants, legal advisers, information systems, public explanatory mechanisms and also responsibly used AI assistants — but only on the condition that they operate under clear ethical, professional and accountability rules.

The problem of the OECD programme is that it does not place such a question at the centre. It speaks of strengthening tax administrations, data, digitalisation and the exchange of information, but it does not speak sufficiently about the taxpayer’s right to high-quality tax assistance.

Without this, “tax morale” is an empty phrase.

Tax morale does not arise because the state teaches people to trust the system more. It arises because the system proves every day that it is worthy of trust. This means that the taxpayer must receive information that is:

accurate, because incorrect information leads to incorrect fulfilment of obligations;
timely, because late information does not prevent harm;
comprehensive, because partial information is often misleading;
understandable, because a right that the taxpayer does not understand does not exist in practice;
traceable, because it must be clear who provided the information, when, on which legal basis and with what effect.

If this is absent, then the tax system is not fair, but punitive. The taxpayer is first left at the mercy of the complexity of the rules, and is then penalised for not having understood them correctly.

For precisely this reason, if the OECD were truly speaking of a fair development-oriented tax system, it should devote a special section to the question:

How can the taxpayer’s right to professional, ethical and accountable assistance in public-charge matters be ensured?

Without this, the digitalisation of tax administration will primarily mean faster supervision. Without this, the exchange of information will primarily mean greater state power. Without this, artificial intelligence will primarily mean automated inequality. Without this, “simplification” will merely mean simplification for the administration, not for the human being.

In conclusion:

A fair tax system does not begin with a penalty, an audit or the exchange of data. It begins with the taxpayer’s right to receive accurate, timely, comprehensive and understandable tax information.

Put even more sharply:

If the state demands complete tax compliance, it must first ensure complete informational fairness.

 

Concluding Assessment

The OECD Tax and Development Days 2026 programme is presented as a development-oriented, professional and inclusive event intended to help states strengthen tax systems, mobilise public revenue and increase trust in tax administration. However, the critical analysis shows that the programme remains within the same intellectual framework that has significantly contributed to today’s global tax inequality: the rules remain almost untouched, while states and taxpayers are expected merely to adapt to them more efficiently.

The programme’s key deficiency is that it speaks of results without sufficiently and honestly opening the question of the fairness of the rules. It speaks of tax certainty, but primarily for large cross-border economic entities. It speaks of simplification, but within a system that remains structurally complex. It speaks of tax morale, but does not begin from the fundamental premise: tax morale can exist only where taxpayers believe that the system treats labour, capital, small enterprises and multinational enterprises equally and fairly.

The greatest danger of this programme is that, beneath the language of development, transparency, data and digitalisation, it consolidates a tax model in which the large have access to rules, agreements, advisers, international procedures and tax certainty, while the small receive obligations, deadlines, forms, supervision and penalties. This is not a fair tax system. It is a system of power asymmetry.

The programme should therefore not be read merely as a technical OECD event. It should be read as a document of political economy. It reveals who has a seat at the table, who writes the rules and who must implement them. In this sense, the OECD does not act merely as a neutral expert intermediary, but as one of the managers of the global tax architecture, providing predictability to the large and imposing compliance on the small.

It is particularly problematic that the programme barely places micro, small and medium-sized enterprises at the centre, even though these enterprises are the backbone of local economies, employment and actual tax payment where value is created. MSMEs have no tax havens, no international structures, no transfer pricing departments and no possibility of conducting multi-year intergovernmental procedures. What they do have is the daily burden of complex rules, compliance costs and legal uncertainty.

An even greater blind spot of the programme is the absence of the question of who provides the taxpayer with accurate, timely, comprehensive and understandable tax information. Without this, there is no fair tax system. If the state requires the correct fulfilment of public-charge obligations, it must first provide the real conditions for the taxpayer to know what their obligation actually is. Tax compliance without informational fairness is not the rule of law, but a punitive apparatus.

For this reason, the foundation of every serious tax reform should be different: no longer the question of how to supervise taxpayers even more effectively, but how to establish a system in which the rules are understandable, information is reliable, assistance is accessible, tax burdens are proportionate, procedures are fair and the responsibility of the state is real.

The final assessment is therefore sharp:

The OECD Tax and Development Days 2026 programme does not dismantle global tax feudalism. On the contrary — it helps to organise, digitalise, legitimise and administratively optimise it.

Or, more briefly:

Tax certainty is created for the large. Tax discipline is created for the small.

And this is precisely the fundamental problem of the modern tax state:

as long as the large participate in shaping the rules while the small merely implement them, the tax system will not be fair, but merely a more efficiently managed form of inequality.

 

12. Transparency of Method: The Analysis as a Result of the “AI Public Authority Analyst” Profile

In fairness to the reader, it must be stated clearly that the above critical analysis of the OECD Tax and Development Days 2026 programme was not prepared as a neutral summary of the OECD programme, but as a value-based, legal and public-administration assessment conducted through the profile of the AI Public Authority Analyst.

This is an analytical agent profile operating on the basis of a predefined conceptual framework, code, rules of reasoning and knowledge base authored by mag. Franc Derganc. The analysis is therefore not merely a description of the programme, but an assessment of the programme from the perspective of a fair tax system, human rights, good administration, public-charge justice and the actual position of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises.

A key element of this profile is the starting point that human rights do not exist merely as formal texts, but as actual conditions of life. The fundamental principle embedded in the AI Public Authority Analyst profile is therefore simple: without conditions, there are no human rights. If an individual, entrepreneur or company does not have access to understandable rules, timely information, a fair procedure, an effective legal remedy and real possibilities to fulfil obligations, then rights exist only on paper.

This principle is particularly important in public-charge matters. Taxes, social security contributions, levies, penalties, interest and administrative obligations are not technical details. They are direct interferences with property, labour, entrepreneurial freedom, social security and the dignity of the individual. Every tax policy must therefore also be assessed through the lens of economic human rights: whether the system enables people to live in dignity, to conduct fair entrepreneurship, to enjoy predictability and legal certainty, and to have a real possibility of participating in the community.

The second fundamental element of the profile is the understanding of language as a bearer of the rule of law and of community. Language is not merely a means of communication. It is the foundation of culture, nationhood, legal comprehensibility and democratic participation. If rules are written in a language that taxpayers do not understand, or if public authority relies on technical jargon that is understandable only to large advisory systems, then formal equality before the law does not mean actual equality. In the tax system, understandable language is therefore a condition of fairness.

The third element of the profile is the principle that without effectiveness of public authority there is no good administration. Good administration is not merely lawful administration. Good administration must also be effective, measurable, accountable, predictable and human-centred. If public authority adopts programmes, strategies and reforms without clearly demonstrating their effects for people, for MSMEs, for public finances, for legal certainty and for trust in the system, then this is not good administration, but the administrative reproduction of the existing state of affairs.

The fourth element of the profile is the incorporated case-law and legal standards of EU law, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Court of Human Rights and constitutional standards of the rule of law. This means that the public-charge system is assessed not only according to whether it has been formally adopted, but also according to whether it respects the principles of legality, proportionality, legal certainty, protection of legitimate expectations, equal treatment, effective legal remedy, protection of property and fair procedure.

For this reason, when assessing the OECD programme, the AI Public Authority Analyst does not merely ask:

What does the programme promise?

The question is much stricter:

Who does the programme actually benefit, who bears the burden, who has access to the rules, who has access to assistance and who has a real possibility of protecting their rights?

Precisely because of this profile, the analysis does not accept the self-evident assumption that terms such as “tax certainty”, “simplification”, “capacity building”, “tax morale”, “data” and “development impact” are positive in themselves. These terms may be useful, but they may also function as the language of legitimising a system in which the power of large economic actors is further entrenched, while smaller taxpayers are subjected to ever greater compliance obligations.

Methodologically, the analysis is therefore designed as a critical assessment of public authority and international tax institutions, not as a promotional summary of the OECD programme. Its task is not to repeat the official language of the programme, but to reveal what that language conceals: asymmetry of power, unequal access to procedures, the disproportionate burden on small taxpayers and the absence of the right to accurate, timely, comprehensive and understandable tax information.

It is also important to emphasise that the AI Public Authority Analyst is not conceived as a substitute for human judgment. It is an analytical tool that helps systematically examine public policies according to predefined criteria: human rights, effectiveness of public authority, linguistic comprehensibility, fairness of public charges, protection of weaker taxpayers, transparency of rules and institutional accountability. The final assessment remains a matter for human judgment, professional expertise and democratic debate.

For this reason, this analysis has also set a standard of transparency for itself. It clearly informs the reader of the value-based and methodological framework from which it proceeds. It does not pretend to be without a position. On the contrary: its position is expressly stated. The tax system must be assessed according to whether it serves the human being, the community, the rule of law and the fair distribution of public burdens — not according to whether it is administratively convenient for the major players of global capital.

In conclusion:

The AI Public Authority Analyst proceeds from the assumption that public authority is not successful when it is able to collect more data, carry out more supervision or create more rules. It is successful when it provides the human being and the small taxpayer with the real conditions for understanding, fulfilling and protecting their rights.

Or, more briefly:

Without conditions, there are no human rights. Without understandable language, there is no rule of law. Without effective public authority, there is no good administration. Without fair information, there is no fair tax system.